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Abstract— Many problems with IP protocol design facilitate the mission of
the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attackers. This paper proposes a new
Hybrid Distributed Single-packet Low-storage (HDSL) IP traceback
framework, which consists of three enhanced DDoS defense mechanisms. The
first mechanism is a Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) to compose a unique
path identifier for validating network paths. The second is a low-storage space
packet logging to locally log routed packets information which is used later for
locating the source of even a single attacking packet. The third, pushes the
aggregates of the attacking packets upstream one or more levels to alleviate the
congestion occurred at or near the target to legitimate packets dropping. Three
algorithms are developed for this purpose. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
is also used to administrate the defense modules of the framework, and
managing network information. Experimental results show that the traceback
performance is improved from many aspects. First, the percentage of false
edges returned is decreased as a result of the proposed accurate low collision
path identifiers. Also, the required logging space is reduced to more than 70%
of other mechanisms. Finally, the ratio of the legitimate packets dropped due to
attacking packets congestion aggregates potentially decreased for deploying the
pushback principle.

I- INTRODUCTION

T

here is no doubt that many DDoS attacks have been
reported daily all over the world, these attacks aim
to hinder legitimate users from accessing a
corporation services or resources, resulting in a revenue loss.
The attackers rely on the fact that Internet routing infrastructure
is mainly concerned by scalability rather security, since routers
neither validate source IP address nor log information regarding
the forwarded packets [1]. DDoS attack methods could be
classified according to the number of attacking packets into
flooding and vulnerability attack [2, 3]. In flooding attack,
which is the most common, the attacker sends a huge number
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of packets to the victim to overwhelm its resources, which may
be network level like routers computation power or bandwidth
[4], or application level like storage capacity, or CPU
processing power [5]. In vulnerability attack, which is harder to
defend, the attackers exploit some weaknesses in the design of
victim's protocols or applications and send a few or even one
packet to get the target system down [3, 4].
Research community spent a lot of time and effort
developing various DDoS attacks combating mechanisms
before, during and after they take place, identifying the pros and
cons of each. The majority of these mechanisms could be
grouped into three main categories, packet marking [6-8],
packet logging [9, 10], and ICMP Traceback [11-13]. Packet
marking mechanisms are composed of two procedures, the first
is carried out by routers to encode routers information into
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packets, whereas the second is carried out by victim to use these
encoded information for reconstructing the attack graph [14,
15]. Packet marking by itself is classified into two types,
Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) and Deterministic Packet
Marking (DPM) [16-19]. In PPM every packet contains
information about only one router of the attack path, so the
victim must collect many packets to reconstruct the attack path
correctly defining a critical term known as termination
condition [20]. Whereas in DPM, every packet should carry
information about all the routers in the attack path which
represents a great challenge, then this information could be used
to distinguish attack packets from legitimate packets at the
victim's firewall [21-24]. Packet logging mechanisms, logs for
packets digests are stored locally at routers or packet monitors
that listen to router interfaces, these routers form an overlay
network that victim could query them later about specific
packet to locate its source. But large space and access time
requirements are the main drawback of this mechanism
[25, 26].
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Traceback or
simply (ITrace) mechanisms, the routers along the attacking
path probabilistically send traceback messages generated for
some packets. These traceback messages are later collected to
reconstruct the attacking path. However, these traceback
messages will exhaust the network bandwidth specially with
large scale DDoS attacks.
Previous methods failed to satisfy the requirements of
accurate trackback with a little computation and storage
overhead, so nowadays all proposed mechanisms tend to
consolidate them getting a hybrid system that mitigate
drawbacks and empower strength points [27-34].
The main contribution of this paper is:
• Implement a deterministic packet marking technique to
compose a distinctive mark for every network path, these
marks are used to differentiate the source of each packet
regardless its source IP address.
• Use a low storage packet marking technique to locally log
packet information, for tracing back the source of even a
single packet.
• Finally, the deployed packet marking facilitate the
applicability of the pushback principle decreasing the
number of legitimate packets dropped due to congestion at
the victim.
The proposed framework is evaluated by comparing it with
the Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE), Hybrid IP Traceback
(HIT), Precise and Practical IP Traceback (PPIT), and Path
Address Scheme (PAS) both mathematically and
experimentally.
The reminder of this paper is composed of the following
sections. Section 2 presents the background and related work.
Section 3 introduces the proposed IP traceback framework in
detail. Section 4 shows the ability of using the pushing back
technique with the proposed framework to move the filtering
process upstream one or more level, Section 5 evaluates and
compares the proposed framework by mathematical analysis
and simulation with other different frameworks, Section 6
introduces deployment and security points, Finally the paper is
summarized in section 7.

II- BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Any traceback framework should have some important
features, first sharp differentiation between legitimate and
attack packets that enable the victim's firewall system to
precisely filter out attack packets, resulting in low false positive
and negative rates. Moreover, ability of locating the source of
the attack packets even if the attacker spoofed the source IP
address of the packet. Also, a minimum amount of storage
space and access time at routers while logging packet digests.
Finally, a low computation overhead in the process of
reconstructing the attack path.
2.1 Packet Marking Mechanism
All introduced packet marking mechanisms aim to encode
path information represented by edge router's IP addresses or
identifiers inside the header of routed packets as they traverse
from their source to destination. Probabilistic Packet Marking
(PPM) and Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) are its most
common types. Savage et al. [14] first introduce PPM, in which
intermediate routers encode their IP addresses or identification
information into the 16-bit identification field. The drawback of
this mechanism is that each packet carries the IP address of only
one router from the whole path, so the victim must collect a
huge number of packets which directly proportional with the
length of packet's path. Introducing a critical point known as
termination condition [20], defined as the exact number of
packets collected by the victim not less or more than necessary
to reconstruct the exact attack path. Despite that this method
was the first step in packet marking and many improvements
have been done on it, but it is not that practical in tracing DDoS
attacks, since it needs a high computation overhead at the victim
to reconstruct the attack path, also gives a higher rate of false
positive and negative edges.
Yaar et al. [21, 23] show that tracing back the attack packet
to know its source is not that important, introducing a new
Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) mechanism. In this
mechanism all packets are marked by all routers identifiers
through their paths, resulting in packets originated from the
same source carry the same mark or path identifier, so these
marks could be used later to precisely differentiate attack
packets and filter them out at the victim. However the main
challenge in this mechanism is to find a perfect method to
accumulate all routers identifiers in this restricted 16-bit packet
identification field in the packet's header, without getting
multiple packets coming from different sources having the
same mark, known as mark's collision problem. DPM
mechanisms are packet tracing rather than source traceback
mechanism, they need a low computation and storage overhead
at victim and routers.
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2.2 Packet Logging Mechanism
In router based traceback mechanisms, routers calculate the
packet digest of every packet passing through them, space
efficient data structure (Bloom filter) [35] could be deployed to
minimize the size of these digests, so reducing the storage
capacity required by each router. The digests and their timestamps are stored locally at routers for future use in the packet's
traceback process.
Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE) is the first practical
deployment of packet logging mechanism, introduced by
Snoeren et al. [36]. In SPIE, a traceback server/group of servers
that are previously supplied by the network topology start(s) the
traceback process from the victim's side towards the attack by
querying the routers about a certain packet at specified time,
then the queried router calculates the packet digest searching it
in its digest table at the specified time, returning the result of
searching back to the traceback server that repeats the query
with next and next routers until identifying the exact packet's
source (attacker).
SPIE has many advantages, for example it can be used to
traceback even a single packet, also it is immune against attacks
like IP spoofing and packet transformation like fragmentation
and tunneling.
However, there are some disadvantages for SPIE especially
for router's memory, since they should have a large storage
space with a high speed access time which improves the digests
storing and searching processes.
Any perfect traceback framework should be continuously
monitor, precisely differentiate between legitimate and attack
packets, and instantly response, which could be achieved using
a hybrid distributed framework.

III- THE NEW HYBRID DISTRIBUTED SINGLE-PACKET LOWSTORAGE (HDSL) IP TRACEBACK FRAMEWORK
A new Hybrid Distributed Single-packet Low-storage
(HDSL) IP Traceback Framework is presented in this section.
It is mainly based on the marking mechanisms in [28, 37], and
the logging mechanisms in [26, 38] utilizing the 16-bit
identification field in the packet's header. 4-bits is defined for
the Logging Flag (LF) part for packet logging, and 12-bit to
hold the path identifiers of the Deterministic Packet Marking
(DPM). This way the utilization reduces the storage and
computation overhead required at routers. Figure 1 shows the
main phases of the proposed framework. It is composed of four
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phases, Protecting Communication Network (PCN), Attack
Detection (AD), Attack Traffic Control (ATC), and Attack
Packet Source Traceback (APST), which will be introduced in
the following subsections in detail.

3.1 Protecting Communication Network (PCN) phase.
Since the DDoS attacks are originated from various sources
in different networks, so the defense framework components
should be distributed in proper points all over the network. So,
a secure channel for exchanging network and control
information among these components should be found.

3.2 Attack Detection (AD) phase.
Figure 2 shows the main modules of the Attack Detection
(AD) phase and the interaction between them. The Attack
Detection (AD) phase consists of two modules, packet marking
and detection. The packet marking module is implemented at
every traceback enabled router to insert the router's mark or
identification information in every packet passing through it.
Many packet marking mechanisms have been proposed
previously in different papers, the proposed marking
mechanism introduced in this paper is shown in figure 3, the
16-bit identification field in the IP Header of the packet will be
used as usual since it is used for packet fragmentation which are
rarely used in practice, but it will be divided into two parts. The
first 4-bits named logging flag (LF) field, this field is used by
the routers in the packet logging mechanism as introduced in
the next sub-sections. The next 12-bit are used in packet
marking mechanism, since as Muthuprasanna et al. introduced
in [39], 12-bit are enough as routers ID to distinguish them
within two-hop neighboring.
So, a 32-bit to 12-bit hash function H ( ) is used to convert
the 32-bit router's IP address (A) to a 12-bit length hash value.
As the IP addresses of Internet routers can be easily known, and
by knowing also the hash function used by the router, the router
mark could be easily spoofed by attacker, so a 12-bit router's
random number (KR) is generated. This value is XORed with
the hash value of the router IP address getting the current router
mark (MR), (MR = H(A) ⊕ KR), router will compute and store
the value of its mark (MR) locally only once.
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Figure 1: The new Hybrid Distributed Single-packet Low-storage (HDSL) IP Traceback Framework.
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of 12-bit identification field in the IP header of the packet.
Besides this fixed size advantage of XOR, it is also so easy to
remove the router's ID value from the path identifier in the
packet header by XORing the router's ID again with that mark
(where: (A ⊕ B) ⊕ B = A). However, there is a drawback for
using XOR operation in composing the packet's path identifier,
if two packets pass through the same group of routers but in
different order, the path identifier for both of them will be equal
(Since: (A ⊕ B) ⊕ C = (C ⊕ B) ⊕ A), returning an incorrect
attacker in some cases, figure 4 shows the problem.

Figure 4: Different orders of the same path [37].

Figure 2: The Attack Detection (AD) phase.

Figure 3: Utilizing the Identification field for packet logging
and marking [39]

This router's identification value (MR) is encoded in the
header of every going packet later, Chen et al. in [37] proposed
using the XOR operation to accumulate the identification
values of all routers the packet will pass through along its path
from the sender to the receiver, without any increase in the size

There are two methods to cope this problem, first
unmasking the Time-To-Life (TTL) field in the packet header
when calculating the packet digest at the router [26], however
this method poses some problems for preserving networks
confidentiality that is not preferred by service providers. The
other method [37] performs a Cyclic-Shift-Lift (CSL) on the old
mark (Mold) in the packet header before XORing it with the
current router identifier (MR), (i.e.: Mnew = CSL(Mold) MR),
and performing Cyclic-Shift-Right (CSR) operation in the
traceback operation as shown in the next subsections. The
second method is preferred by service providers since it does
not exposures their network's confidentiality.
The Detection module is the second part of the Attack
Detection (AD) phase that is implemented at the Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) at the perimeter of the protected
networks. Where every IDS constructs a Filter Table (FT) that
records source IP address and mark pair. When the number of
Mismatches-counter (TMC) exceeds a pre-specified value, the
IDS turns from learning mode to the attack mode that will be
explained in next sections. Figure 5 shows the Attack Detection
(AD) Algorithm.
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Figure 5: Attack Detection (AD) Algorithm.

3.3 Attack Traffic Control (ATC) phase.
Figure 6 shows the block diagram of the Attack Traffic
Control (ATC) phase modules and the interaction among them.
This phase is implemented at the IDS when discovering an
attack, any packet state could be one of three, the source IP
address and the mark pair is found in the Filter Table that means
the packet is legitimate and the IDS will accept it. Or, the source
IP address found in the Filter Table but with a wrong mark that
means it may be a spoofed packet or the packet has changed its

route, then the IDS should move this pair to the Check List (CL)
to verify its state. Finally, the source IP address is not found in
the Filter Table that means this is a new packet and the IDS
should move it to the Check List for verification.
Verifying an entry in the Check List is done by sending
periodically a fixed number of echo messages with a specific
content to the tested source IP address, and upon receiving a
reply with the same content, the source IP address and mark pair
is verified and they are moved to the Filter Table. Otherwise,
the source IP address is spoofed and it will be moved to the
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Filter Table with a special mark "ex. **" that indicates a
spoofed source IP address to be dropped.
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Figure 7 shows the Attack Traffic Control (ATC) algorithm.
3.4 Attack Packet Source Traceback (APST) phase.
Figure 8 shows the Attack Packet Source Traceback (APST)
phase modules, used to traceback the attack packet to its source
using the logging flag (LF) field in the packet's header and the
packet's digests logged at the routers.
It is consisting of the three modules, Source Path Isolation
Engine (SPIE) [26], SPIE Traceback Manager (STM), SPIE
Collection & Reduction Agent (SCAR), and Data Generation
Agent (DGA). But the contribution in this paper is that, instead
of logging the packet's digests in every router along the path, a
new LF field of 4-bit (maximum of 16 decimal values from 0 to
15) has been introduced used to decide if the logging will be
done every 2, 3 or even 15 routers in the path. Resulting in a
decreased storage space required at the routers.

Figure 6: The Attack Traffic Control (ATC) phase.

Figure 7: The Attack Traffic Control (ATC) Algorithm.
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Figure (9-a) shows the complete packet marking and
logging with the logging flag (LF) field less than 2, this means
that the LF field will take only two values 0 and 1, and the
logging process will happen when the router finds the LF field
equals to 0. This means that the logging ratio is reduced to 50%
of SPIE technique.
Figure (9-b) shows the source traceback operation, to trace
the source of a given packet from the victim to the attacker.
Figure 10 shows the Attack Packet Source Traceback
(APST) algorithm
Figure 8: The Attack Packet Source Traceback (APST) phase.

Figure 9: With LF<2 a complete

(a) Packet marking and Logging,

(b) Packet Traceback.
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Figure 10: The Attack Packet Source Traceback (APST) algorithm.

Also figure 11 shows the proposed framework's flow chart.

Figure 11: The proposed framework's flow chart
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IV. PUSHBACK TECHNIQUE APPLICABILITY
Mahajan et al. introduced in [40] due to a congestion in
some network links, some legitimate traffic could be dropped
resulting in a degrading performance of the network, figure 12
shows a clear case of this situation. Since link L0 is congested
due to DDoS attack, so good traffic coming from link L1 may
be dropped before reaching its destination's D. So, if the attack
traffic could be filtered one level up, i.e. at routers R2 and R3,
traffic coming from link L1 could be flow smoothly to its
destination D. But the situation of good traffic from link L1 may
be repeated for traffic coming from link L5 and L6, so pushing
the attack traffic up another one level to be filtered at routers
R4 and R7 respectively, the traffic coming from L5 and L6 can
be smoothly flow toward its destinations D. This process of
pushing attack traffic far away from the victim guarantees that
no legitimate traffic may be dropped due to traffic of DDoS
attack. Thanks to the proposed packet marking mechanism
introduced in this paper the pushback technique could be easily
deployed, as introduced in the next section of performance
evaluation and experimental results.

edges returned. PPIT improves the performance of the HIT by
utilizing the 16-bit limited marking space in the packet header
into a 2-bit hop count used to selectively log the passing packet
digests, and 14-bit to encode the passing router's ID numbers
into the packet header. Resulting in a noticeable decrease in the
storage space required at intermediate routers. Finally, in PAS
IP addresses stored at every terminal host are replaced by path
addresses stored at intermediate routers. Where every traceback
enabled router is assigned a unique number used to compose an
authentic mark for each network path, these authentic marks
could be used to filter out and push back the attacking traffic
improving the overall performance of the defense system.
5.1 Routers storage space overhead
Packets will be logged locally by routers in the proposed
framework in the following cases:
(1) IP fragments,
(2) Non-fragmented packets need to be logged at routers,
which include:
(a) Non-fragmented packets not logged in the k upstream
routers.
(b) Non-fragmented packets logged at the direct upstream
router but transformed at the current router.
(c) Non-fragmented packets logged in one of the upstream
routers between case (a) and case (b) above.
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF LOGGED PACKETS AT DIFFERENT CONDITIONS.
1.
2.
2.1

2.2

2.3
Figure 12: Network Congestion problem [40].

V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The storage space, traceback process overhead, and the
accuracy of the proposed framework will be evaluated
analytically and by simulation, then the obtained results will be
compared with SPIE [26], HIT [28], PPIT [38], and PAS [24]
frameworks. SPIE is a direct implementation of the traditional
log-based IP traceback mechanism, in which the digests of all
passing packets will be logged in every intermediate router that
requires a huge logging space and traceback convergence time.
HIT integrates two DDoS defense mechanisms getting a
hybrid one, Packet Marking to encode the path information in
every passing packet and Packet Logging to store all passing
packet digests in the intermediate routers. This integration
reduces the traceback process time and the number of false

Packet type
IP fragments.
Non-fragmented packets not
logged in the upstream routers
(includes 2.1. 2.2 and 2.3 below).
Non-fragmented packets not
logged at any k upstream routers.
Non-fragmented packets not
logged at the direct upstream
router but transformed at the
current router.
Non-fragmented packets logged
in one k upstream router and not
logged at direct upstream router,
but
transformed
in
the
current router.

Percentage
a
(1-a)Q
(1-a)(1-Q)k

(1-a)Qb

(1-a)[∑𝑘𝑛=1(1 − 𝑄)𝑛−1 ]

Suppose the following letters refer to the types of packets
forwarded by a router: P the percentage of packets to be logged
at the router, the percentage of IP fragmented packets, b the
percentage of transformed packets and Q the percentage of
packet not fragmented but needed to be logged at the router.
Table 1 show the percentage of logged packets at different
conditions. From these parameters we get:
P = a + (1-a) Q
And Q could have the following value:

(1)

1, 𝑘 = 0
𝑄 = 𝑓(𝑥) = {
(2)
(1 − 𝑄)𝑘 + 𝑄𝑏 ∑𝑘𝑛=1(1 − 𝑄)𝑛−1 , 𝑘 > 0
Where: k refers to the number of routers between two
successive logs that can take values from 0 to maximum of 15,
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since it represents the Logging Flag (LF) field of 4-bits in the
identification field of the packet header. From Equation (1) the
value of Q could be expressed as:
Q=

(𝑃−𝑎)
(1−𝑎)

(3)

TABLE 2
DIFFERENT PERCENTAGES OF PACKET LOGGING WITH DIFFERENT K VALUES
Value of k
Approximate value of P
Notes
0
1
SPIE
1
0.5
HIT
2
0.375
PPIT
3
0.275
HDSL
4
0.225
HDSL
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hosts are randomly chosen, and no fragmentation or
transformation operations are applied on packets as they move
through the network.
These simulations will measure important DDoS defense
metrics concerning packet logging overhead, traceback
procedure overhead, and traceback accuracy. The results of
these simulations will confirm the analytical results obtained
above.

As McCreary et al. mentioned in [41] a ≤ 0.25% and Border
et al. mentioned in [42] b ≤ 3% and substituting the value of Q
from equation 3 in equation 2 with values of k ranging from 0
to 15 the approximate value of the percentage of packets needed
to be logged at the router P is shown in Table 2.
5.2 Traceback process overhead
To traceback the source of a packet, the traceback server
queries the routers in the network starting from its nearest router
with the help of the value of k in the logging flag field, figure
9-b shows the complete traceback process with the value of k
equals 2 and a path length of 5 network segments and 4
intermediate traceback enabled routers with a separate digest
table for every router interface. Logically, the traceback process
overhead is directly proportional to the number of queries at
routers and digest tables that will decrease directly by
increasing the value of k. Let NRk and NRa represent the
queried routers during the traceback process in the proposed
algorithm and SPIE algorithm, respectively. So,
NRk = P × NRa

(5)

5.3 Traceback accuracy
The traceback system accuracy could be defined as the
number of false positive edges obtained from the process
compared with the actual packet route. And the reason of this
inaccuracy problem may result from the deployment of bloom
filters for optimizing the process of recording packet digests in
the routers, or form the traceback process by itself.

Figure 13: Logging probability vs. various values of k.

The storage overhead in the network resulting from routers
logging packets could be measured by calculating the logging
probability of routers with different values of k. As shown in
figure 13, by increasing the value of k the logging probability
of routers will decrease, resulting in a more utilization of
storage overhead required by the routers in the network and
better performance than HIT and PPIT algorithms, that support
the results obtained in Table 1.

(a) Using a separate digest table for logging packet digests will
result in decreasing the number of searches, which leads to
a reduction in errors resulting from using Bloom filters.
(b) Using the simple XOR operation for accumulating and
extracting the routers identifiers gives no chance for
generating errors leading to reduced number of generated
false positive edges.
5.4 Simulation
Network Simulator (NS2) [43] simulations have been done
based on AT&T POP-level topology collected by Rocketfuel
[44]. These experimental simulations are composed of 200
nodes and 290 links, 50 out of these 200 nodes are core routers
which have more than 2 neighbors. Assuming terminal routers
are directly connected with end hosts, sending and receiving

Figure 14: Number of queries vs. path of different lengths with
different values of k.

Also examining the number of routers queried to traceback
a packet to its source with paths with different length ranging
from directly connected to path length of maximum 30 hops.
These numbers of queries are used to express the traceback
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process overhead, figure 14 shows a comparison between
different DDoS algorithms, it is clear that as the value of k
increases the number of queries decreases.

Figure 17: The effect of applying pushback technique in the ratio of
acceptance of legitimate and attack packets.

Figure 15: Accuracy of different algorithms with different path lengths.

The number of false edges returned in the attack graph could
be used as a tool to measure the accuracy of the traceback
system; these false edges could be resulted from the collision
between different packet marks, which are very low as a result
of using these simple and straight forward XOR operations in
the marking accumulating process. Figure 15 shows that with
different algorithms and different path lengths.

Figure 17 shows two scenarios of the ratio of legitimate and
attack packets accepted with different number of attackers at
the firewall and one level up. Since as introduced above in
section 4, as the number of attack packets increase there may be
some legitimate packets dropped due to congestion at the
firewall, resulting in a degrading in the network performance.
As a solution for this case the filtering process could be pushed
up one or more level resulting in an improving in the network
performance.

Figure 18: Traceback accuracy vs. legacy routers existence.

Figure 16: Collision rates of packet identifiers for different algorithms.

Two or more packets of different sources may have the same
packet identifiers which known as identifier's collision that
results in a failure in the traceback process and filtering process.
But thanks to using Cyclic Shit (CS) operations in marking and
unmarking processes, the collision rates are very low or
approximately zero. Figure 16 shows a comparison between
different algorithms in the collision problem.

In some algorithms the existence of legacy routers may
hinder the processes of defense and traceback, for example
using the Time-To-Life (TTL) field in the packet header in Pi
scheme [23] for keeping the correct order of the passing nodes
which results in an error ratio in reconstructing the attack path
and filtering packet processes. But in the proposed framework
the number of traceback enabled router does not affect greatly
the traceback process as shown in figure 18.
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traceback server will stop the trace process whatever the
marking field is empty or not.

VII. CONCLUSION

Figure 19: Relation between overlay nodes no. and false edges.

Also, the number of traceback enabled routers deployed on
the protected network forms an overlay network. As the number
of overlay nodes increase the collision between path identifiers
decrease resulting in a high accuracy in the filtering process
performed at the IDS, and a high accuracy in the traceback
process. Figure 19 shows this point.

VI. DISCUSSION
6.1 Deployment
Packet traceback frameworks could combine two wellknown DDoS defense mechanisms, packet logging and packet
marking. Packet logging which is used to log the packet digests
locally, could be deployed by the router itself or an independent
device named network tap. Packet marking encodes the ID
information of the passing packets inside their header. The two
proposed modifications handle the two drawbacks of the
Internet routing infrastructure.
The routers capable of doing these two modifications are
named traceback enabled routers, and as the number of these
routers increase in the network the more accurate results of the
traceback process. These routers together form an overlay
network and every router should know its overlay neighbors,
besides the traceback server should learn the topology of the
overlay network.

Defending against DDoS attacks is an important searching
point today. Many mechanisms have been proposed like packet
marking, packet logging, and iTrace. However to precisely
filter out attack packets and accurately traceback the attacker
cooperation and collaboration among these mechanisms to
produce a hybrid defense framework should be done. Actually,
many defense frameworks such HIT and PPIT combined the
packet marking and logging mechanisms to enhance the
defense framework.
This paper utilizes the limited space of the 16-bit
identification field in the packet header to log the packet IDs to
compose a unique mark for each network path, also the router's
packet logging process is managed to selectively log packet's
information used later for tracing back even a single attacking
packet and the pushback principle is deployed to overcome the
traffic congestion problem. Based on these three principles a
new Hybrid Distributed Single-packet Low-storage (HDSL)
framework is proposed.
The work presented in this paper could be extended by
optimizing the Logging Flag (LF) field determining its optimal
value that eliminate the tradeoffs between small convergence
time and accurate traceback edges returned. Also, despite
testing the performance and applicability of the proposed
framework in NS2, examining it in a real network is an
important stage.
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Arabic Title

 :HDSLإطار عمل هجين لتتبع الحزم من النوع  IPموزع ،أحادي الحزمة
ومنخفض التخزين

Abstract in Arabic:
تسهل العديد من المشكالت المتعلقة بتصميم بروتوكول  IPمهمة مهاجمي رفض
الخدمة الموزعة ( .)DDoSتقترح هذه الورقة إطار عمل جديد ) (HDSLيتبع حزم
بروتوكول  IPوهو نظام هجين موزع ،أحادي الحزمة ومنخفض التخزين ،ويتكون من
ثالث آليات محسنة للدفاع ضد الهجموم من النوع  .DDoSاآللية األولى هي الترقيم
اإللزامي للحزم ( )DPMلتكوين معرف مسار فريد للتحقق من مصدر وصحة مسارات
الشبكة .والثاني هو تسجيل معلومات الحزم منخفض المساحة لتسجيل معلومات الحزم

الموجهة محليًا والتي يتم استخدامها الحقًا لتحديد مصدر حتى حزمة مهاجمة واحدة.
والثالث ،يدفع مجاميع الحزم المهاجمة إلى مستوى واحد أو أكثر ألعلى للتخفيف من
االزدحام الذي حدث عند الهدف أو بالقرب منه والذي قد يتسبب في إسقاط الحزم المشروعة.
تم تطوير ثالث خوارزميات لهذا الغرض .يستخدم نظام كشف التطفل ( )IDSأي ً
ضا إلدارة
وحدات الدفاع في إطار العمل ،وإدارة معلومات الشبكة .تظهر النتائج التجريبية أن أداء
التتبع قد تحسن من عدة جوانب .أو ًال ،تم تقليل النسبة المئوية للحواف الزائفة التي يتم
إرجاعها كنتيجة لمعرفات مسار االصطدام المنخفض الدقيقة المقترحة .أي ً
ضا ،تم تقليل
مساحة التسجيل المطلوبة إلى أكثر من  ٪70مقارنة باآلليات األخرى .أخيرً ا ،نسبة الحزم
المشروعة التي تم إسقاطها بسبب اإلزدحام الناتج عن مهاجمة مجاميع الحزم قد انخفضت
بدرجة كبيرة بفضل تطبيق مبدأ دفع التصدي لألمام

